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he turnaround in economic policy from the late 1950s was remarkable.
Protectionism was abandoned and exporting incentivised. As Barry and
Daly (2011) admit, Conventional wisdom accords the bulk of the credit for the
turnaround in policy to Seán Lemass, Minister for Industry and Commerce in
most Fianna Fáil governments since 1932 and Taoiseach from 1959 to 1966,
and T. K. Whitaker, Secretary of the Department of Finance from 1956 to 1969.
Their main agenda is to set the record straight about the role of Mr. Whitaker
in this historical turnaround in economic policy in Ireland. Their bottom line:
Conventional wisdom is wrong. They attempt to illustrate this through a
critique of our Walsh and Whelan (2010) paper. In our response to their paper
we wish to address three issues. First, outline the real essence of our paper;
secondly defend our analytical frameworks; and finally, place their new thesis
on the role of Whitaker in economic policy during the “long 1950s” in the
context of our paper and mainstream beliefs.
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Our paper focuses on how academic ideas were disseminated into public
policy in the Ireland of the 1950s. The ideas on Economic development that are
beautifully written in Hirschman (1957, 1958 and 1968) on Investment
Criteria, Regional Dualism, the Strategy of Economic Development through
Capital Formation and the Political Economy of Import-Substituting
Industrialisation are clearly present in the design and implementation of
Ireland’s industrial/export policy. Killeen (1975), then director of the
Industrial Development Autority (IDA), in his paper to the Society (SSISI)
articulates these strategies without any reference to Hirschman. Our question
was simply to address who was promoting such ideas? Professor Louden Ryan
addressed the Society about “Investment Criteria in Ireland” in 1961, which
did quote Hirschman. His analysis was clearly a blueprint for the industrial
policy in Ireland that followed. Louden Ryan was appointed to the Capital
Investment Advisory Committee in 1956, which gave him a direct route into
the formation of economic policy at the time. Garrett FitzGerald (1958)
emphasises the role of the Capital Investment Committee in the formation of
policy at the time of the great turnaround. The Grey Book, Economic
Development, has indeed served to shut the door on the past; the third thin blue
pamphlet from the Capital Investment Committee has bolted it; and the
Government White Paper, Economic Expansion, seems to have barred it. But
simultaneously all three have opened a new door, and we who, like Alice, have
for some time past been shrinking, can peer through it at “the loveliest garden
you ever saw.” (p. 193).
But who was to do the re-thinking? One body, set up by the then Minister
for Finance, at the end of November, 1956, was excellently equipped to start the
ball rolling—to prepare the groundwork for a positive programme of economic
expansion. This was the Capital Investment Advisory Committee.… (p. 194).
Barry and Daly (2011) have nothing to say about the similarities in official
Irish industrial/export policy over the generations with the investment criteria
outlined by Ryan in the 1960s and in Hirschman in the 1950s. This is the
central thesis of our paper.
Yet, as suggested by Barry and Daly (2011) and articulated in FitzGerald
(1958) we also realise that Irish economic policy came out of a melting pot of
academic ideas, external political and economic pressures, and individuals
from different government departments. To quote Garrett FitzGerald (1958)
on his review of Whitaker’s (1956) paper to the Society: These ideas were not
novel – they had been expressed for years, even for decades, by academic
economists, and by the Central Bank …. But the case for a revision of current
policies had rarely been so well put as it was in this paper, and, most novel of
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anonymity into the public forum. (p. 196). Whitaker had emerged as a leader.
Lemass and Whitaker tend to get the credit for the new economic strategy as
they were the official leaders at the time of key legislative policy changes. 
Barry and Daly (2011) wish to focus on how much we should credit
Whitaker in person with, and in addition, as a side show, criticise our
analytical backdrop to the evolution of industrial policy in Ireland. Let us
defend the positions we take here. 
III  DEFENDING OUR POSITIONS
Barry (1999) boxes Irish industrial policy into a world of FDI induced
exporting with weak linkages to domestic industry. This has always been his
narrow view of the world. Going as far back as Walsh and Whelan (2000), we
never fell into this narrow view of industrial policy in Ireland: Our analysis
highlights the importance of moving away from an indigenous and foreign firm
dualism that has dominated the analysis of Irish manufacturing to the
evolution of export promoting and import competing production within sectors
of Irish manufacturing (Walsh and Whelan 2000, p. 20). Most development
economists understand that an exporting base can come first from traditional
indigenous bases, in our case agri-business. Clearly foreign direct investment
can help. We have always been clear that Industrial Policy in its origin and
implementation throughout the years was about getting an exporting
industrial base up and running. This was designed for the traditional food and
drink sector with opportunities for FDI. While others like Barry (1999)
continued to think in terms of FDI induced industrialisation, we always felt
this was wrong, particularly when you look at employment figures over time.
Our focus is, and has always been, on the origins and evolution of an exporting
base. Exporting was dominated by indigenous traditional industry in the early
days and such sectors remained large in employment right into the 1990s. 
It is because of this emphasis on developing an exporting base that we call
industrial policy in Ireland a more general export oriented policy. FitzGerald
(1958) highlights this as he quotes the 1958 Government White Paper: What
is now required is a greater emphasis on productive expenditure which (will)
increase national output – particularly of goods capable of meeting competition
in export markets (FitzGerald, 1958, p. 199). Cleary Whitaker’s lack of
emphasis on FDI and concern for agricultural interests is consistent with a
focus on export expansion. We therefore do not understand Barry and Daly
(2011) when they say Whitaker was not a supporter of industrial policy as his
main concern was creating an export base around traditional agricultural and
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industrial policy because there was little mention of FDI in ‘Economic
Development’ and because Whitaker wanted a focus on agri-business shows a
gross misunderstanding of the nature of industrial policy at that time.
Industrial policy at the time, and for many years after, was focused on 
an export policy rather than FDI in inception. Traditional food and 
drink industries always played a central role. FDI grew in importance over
time. 
In terms of the importance of linkages in Irish Industrial-export policy,
there has always been an official focus on generating supply side capabilities
using linkages as outlined in Killeen (1975). One of the big investment criteria
was employment creation. As in Hirschman, the focus was on high valued
added exporting. An economy via linkages would induce employment in other
sectors as a result of an expansion in exporting. “Jobless” exporting growth
was an issue for the IDA for years, but it had a long history of defending its
strategy by saying employment gains would be generated elsewhere reflecting
general equilibrium linkages across industries. Hirschman is the godfather of
such thinking. The Walsh and Whelan (2000) paper is clear that while
linkages are stronger in traditional exporting sectors, there are also some
linkages in FDI sectors: The analysis also highlights how the increasing
dominance of export production has resulted in the creation of many jobs in
small Irish business across all sectors of manufacturing … (Walsh and Whelan
2000, p. 20). As stated in Gorg, Henry, Strobl, and Walsh (2009) Moreover,
Ireland has operated a number of explicit policy programs to foster linkages
between foreign multinationals and domestic suppliers (Ruane, 2001) (p. 334).
Their empirical evidence further supports the idea of strong linkages between
exporting FDI firms and local businesses. 
We also have an econometric piece, Li, Walsh and Whelan (2007), that
picks up forward vertical linkages in Ireland and should be respected for the
work that is in it. Knowing that certain individuals, like Barry, ignore or feel
that such linkages did not exist, we also documented IDA policy which spells
out the need to create such linkages in black and white since inception of
industrial policy. The Hirschman investment criteria based on linkages is a big
part of official policy and our empirical evidence suggests that such ambitions
have been realised in the evolution of the exporting base over time.
Hirschman’s big idea was to move away from an industrial policy that
promoted Import-Substituting Industrialisation (ISI) of final goods to one that
promoted ISI of intermediate products that supplied exporting companies.
Ireland did this with some success. While important, linkages was only part II
of our paper. 
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Whitaker clearly fought for the abolition of tariffs and for export
promotion. This is first order. This is what he gets the credit for. Barry and
Daly (2011) question his involvement in promoting strategic export tax relief,
strategic tariff reductions, regional policy, and foreign ownership in export
policy to achieve the overall trade liberalisation objective. Barry and Daly
(2011) do not give credit to the overall theory and insights we outline on the
Political Economy of transition from protectionism to export led growth.
Hence, they do not engage in Hirschman’s dualism in industry and transition
theories. He wrote a “positive” theory of change that is a feature of many
countries. We recited these ideas of the political economy of transition using
the models of Roland (2000). This is a theoretical foundation that explains how
governments can control interest groups and design reforms that achieve the
twin targets of maximising social welfare (interests of society) and winning
political support. In this context, the overall aim was to simply reduce tariffs
and expand exporting but as our positive theory of change suggests, whether
you want to ex-ante or not, one would have to manage constituencies in
society. The powerful import competing firms would have to be managed with
a strategic phasing out of tariffs. Alongside this one would need to fast track
export growth to build up constituencies that support the transition. While
export tax relief for manufacturing only, regional policy and foreign ownership
in export policy might have worried Whitaker and others, they would be
obvious strategic instruments to get the export base moving. 
Even if policymakers have certain objections they have to work within
these political constraints and hence explain the empirical outcomes that we
document. As FitzGerald (1958) quotes the Statist’s view of Whitaker’s 1956
seminal piece: Mr. Whitaker … shows a complete grasp of his subject. Yet this
is not a dust-dry economic treatise but a study which takes into account the
psychological attitude underlying economic problems and which has a careful
regard for the human factors involved (FitzGerald 1958 p. 202). Whitaker at
the end of the day understood the political constraints even if, as documented
by Barry and Daly (2011) he had reservations about them: We have presented
archival evidence that Whitaker, as Secretary of the Department of Finance,
opposed the introduction of export profits tax relief (for clearly defensible
reasons), that he argued for immediate across the board tariff reductions rather
than advising that they be delayed until new export-oriented industry had
came on stream, and that he was overruled in arguing against decentralisation
of industry (Barry and Daly, 2011). We need to understand that political
constraints in the end shape policy in implementation, but debates between
constituencies rage during their design. What Barry and Daly (2011) miss is
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happened and why Whitaker, and those who followed, recognised that he had
no choice but to be governed by such political constraints whether he liked it
or not. Whitaker clearly wanted a “big bang” implementation, but a
“gradualist” implementation is always the outcome once one takes political
constraints into account. Hirschman’s theories on managing regional Dualism
and the Political Economy of reversing the impacts of Import-Substituting
Industrialisation helps us understand these outcomes.
V CONCLUSIONS
Whitaker played a key leadership role in the fight for the abolition of
tariffs and for export promotion. This is the primary structural change in
Ireland’s economic policy. Whitaker went along with the strategic
implementation of such, even if he had concerns over the policy instruments.
This is interesting but only second order. 
Do Walsh and Whelan (2010) provide us with an interesting political
economy analytical framework to understand the move from protectionism to
exporting? Do they provide some evidence that Hirschman’s ideas found their
way into the conversation at the top table in the design and management of
our transition from protectionism to export oriented? We think yes. 
Should we as conventionally done give the credit to Whitaker? Academia,
external pressures, electoral pressures, agricultural lobbies all had a role but
Whitaker clearly fought for the abolition of tariffs and for export promotion
economy wide. We feel the credit given to Whitaker is justified.
We accept we label everything as Whitaker’s export oriented industrial
policy, but he was there at its inception, although political constraints may
have taken over during its implementation. Our political economy framework
allows one understand how this happened.
In summary, Barry and Daly (2011) do not change the conventional
wisdom about Whitaker. In addition, we hope that this reply has explained the
main purpose of our paper and defended our analytical framework. We believe
that Walsh and Whelan (2010) does provide an interesting perspective on the
political economy of transition dynamics in Ireland’s road to export-oriented
growth. 
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